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Introduction Until 2009, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) not only came on top in every Turkish election it entered since its foundation in 2001, it managed to increase its vote share each time as well, reaching 47 percent in 2007 (Table 1) . That is why when the party's vote share fell 8 percentage points in the 29 March 2009 local administrations election, many analysts treated it as if it was an unusual event and a major failure for the AKP despite the party finishing the election first and far ahead of all other parties. Some of them even wondered if that date was the beginning of the end for the AKP. In other words, the party's vote loss was considered a shock, and a permanent one at that. To assess the validity of this assertion however, one needs first to determine whether the outcomes of the 2004 and 2007 elections, with which the 2009 one is being contrasted, are normal. This would be possible only by considering many more elections in the analysis. To recognize and understand the patterns that will emerge from such an analysis of historical data, one needs also a theory of voter behavior.
The economic voting literature can provide the theoretical perspective needed. This literature explains why it is more likely for an incumbent party to lose All of the studies mentioned, besides taking the 2004 election as their main reference, base their analyses on descriptive statistics. 2 Köksal, Civan and Genç (2010) use regression analysis and take 2007 election as its reference point. However, they consider vote movements only between three largest parties, ignoring smaller ones which get considerable amount of votes especially in local elections. Like the others, they ignore elections held prior to 2004. The present paper intends to make a contribution by studying the results of the 2009 elections relative to those of all elections since 1951, local or parliamentary, and in particular to that of 2007, 1 The Republican People's Party (CHP) was able to raise its vote share between the 1973 and 1977 parliamentary elections but that was only after being in power for less than ten months. Also, at the time of the 1977 election the party was not the incumbent party. 2 Also it appears that Çarkoğlu (2009) and Şekercioğlu (2009) do not use the final official statistics but the preliminary election data. For example, they report the nationwide vote share of AKP as 34.8 whereas the true figure is 34.4. through application of rigorous statistical methods. To put it all in perspective, the analysis will be carried out in light of the economic voting literature, and will take into account the political realignments that have taken place in Turkey. Besides anticipating the direction of the incumbent party's vote change, questions such as, what were its causes, whether it was unusually large, whether it was temporary or permanent, how it was distributed among the opposition parties and across the country, and whether there was some vote traffic also between the opposition parties, will be addressed as well. This paper will be organized as follows. In the next two sections, the literature on economic voting, and the political realignments in Turkey will be summarized, respectively. Then in section four, the outcome of the 2009 election will be contrasted to what would be expected based on the patterns observed in the past twenty-six National Assembly, Senate, and Provincial Council elections held between 1951 and 2007, to see how well it fits the historical patterns. For this purpose, a vote equation developed by Akarca and Tansel (2006) and later updated by Akarca (2009) , which summarizes the time-series data of these elections, will be utilized after further updating. This equation takes into account all of the key factors mentioned in the economic voting literature, as well as the political realignments that has taken place. Thus it will allow us to estimate the effect of each of these on the vote loss suffered by the AKP. In section five, cross-provincial data pertaining to the 2007 and 2009 elections will be examined and modeled to study the interparty vote movements between the two elections. The destination of the votes lost by the AKP will be the focus of this section but vote transfers between other parties will also be studied. Because the vote shifts are likely to vary across regions in a country like Turkey which exhibits great deal of regional diversity in terms of demographic, economic, social, cultural characteristics, and consequently, in terms of political tendencies, this analysis will be carried out separately for each region of the country. In accomplishing the latter, instead of defining the regions in an ad-hoc manner, or using a regional division based only on geographical considerations, a partition determined through the application of cluster analysis to cross-provincial data from the five elections held between 1999 and 2009 by Akarca and Başlevent (2010) will be utilized. Finally, the conclusions reached will be listed in the last section.
Economic voting
Understanding the behavior of voters is the key to predicting and interpreting such things as election outcomes, longevity of governments, election timing, political fragmentation, and political business cycles. Consequently, a field has developed over the last four decades or so, analyzing how voters vote, referred to as economic voting. Borrowing the definition of Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000), "economic voting is a field that mixes economics and political science and does so by means of econometrics." In view of the detailed surveys by Lewis-Beck (1988), Nannestad and Paldam (1994) , Norpoth (1996) , Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000), Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) , and Akarca and Tansel (2006 and 2007) , only a summary and not another survey of the literature on economic voting will be presented here.
According to this literature, most of the voters align themselves with a party that they identify as representing their interests and ideology. Thus they tend to choose the same party they voted for in the previous election. This creates a great amount of inertia in the political system. 3 However, a portion of incumbent party supporters vote strategically. They shift their votes to other parties to check the power of the incumbent party. This tendency is stronger in elections which give a chance to voters to warn the government without toppling it, such as in midterm congressional elections in the U.S., European Parliament elections in European Union countries, and local administrations or parliamentary by elections in Turkey. Consequently, parties which control the central government, tend to do poorly in these types of elections. Existence of threshold regulations in parliamentary general elections, such as the minimum 10 percent nationwide vote share requirement to gain representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, contributes to this effect as well. Some of the small party supporters, who vote strategically for one of the major parties in domestic parliamentary elections not to waste their vote, return to their first choices in the elections where no such handicaps apply.
Ruling involves making some compromises and unpopular or bad decisions, and shelving some promises. These cost incumbent parties some votes as well. The "cost of ruling", as some refers to it in the literature, rises with the time spent in power, as disappointments with the incumbent parties accumulate. On the other hand, incumbency has its advantages too, and it can offset part of the losses due to strategic-voting and cost of ruling. Besides things like access to the media and name recognition, it includes ability to indulge in transfer activities such as providing services, subsidies and patronage, and picking locations of government investment and public work projects, to benefit those who support incumbent parties.
The economy provides another way for an incumbent party to offset the vote losses due to strategic voting and cost of ruling. The voters reward incumbents for a good economic performance, and punish them for a bad one. However, in making their economic evaluations, they tend to be retrospective and myopic. They look back no more than a year or so. This and the fact that they give more weight to growth than inflation, give incentives to governments to conduct expansionary economic policies before an election and then switch to restrictive policies after the election to fight their inflationary effects. The governments are also likely to postpone the necessary adjustments to the economy at least until after elections. In short, the behavior of the voters may be at the root of political business cycles observed in so many countries. Voters judge governments ego-tropically as well as socio-tropically. In other words, they consider not only changes in their own economic well-being but others' as well. The latter may be out of concern for their fellow countrymen but also because they may be using government's nationwide performance as an indicator of its competence.
Empirical findings show that, at the national level, the gains from good economic performance (assuming that that is the case) and incumbency advantage rarely make up for vote losses between two parliamentary elections due to strategicvoting and cost of ruling. That is why in democratic countries, the power eventually changes hands. If the incumbent party has come to power with a high vote share, it can remain in power for more than one term, despite losing ground. This was the case in Turkey with the Democrat Party in the fifties, with the Justice Party in the sixties, and with the Motherland Party (ANAP) in the eighties. When the incumbent party is relatively weak to start with, it remains in power at best one term, elections are often called way before their constitutionally mandated times, and coalition governments become the norm, as was the case in Turkey during the seventies and nineties. It is rare for an incumbent party to raise its vote share after serving a full legislative term. As mentioned above, when it happened to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2007, it was the first time this has occurred in Turkey since 1954. It occurred not only because economic conditions prevailing in 2007 were very good and together with the incumbency advantage it more than offset the party's vote losses due to strategic-voting and cost of ruling, but also because they coincided with the political realignment process that was going on at the time. Between 1999 and 2007 a large portion of voters deserted the parties they identified as representing their interests and ideology, in favor of the AKP. There were other realignments in Turkish politics besides this one. The economic voting literature focuses on vote changes at the margin, but does not address such massive shifts in party loyalties which occur from time to time. However the latter has to be taken into account to isolate the other effects and to understand the political developments properly. The causes of the realignments mentioned are beyond the scope of the present paper. However a brief discussion of them would motivate the terms which will be entered into the vote equation to account for the realignments. Furthermore, such a discussion will provide a better understanding of the current political scene as well.
Political realignments in Turkey
When choices denied to them before become available, when the needs and outlook of voters change but their parties fail to adapt, or when their parties change in a manner that deviates from their interests and beliefs, voters shift their allegiances to other parties. These occur quite infrequently and involve much larger and permanent vote movements than the marginal and transitory changes discussed in the previous section. Three such realignments have taken place in Turkey since it entered multi-party democracy in 1946. Two of these can be classified as major and one as minor. The first of these occurred between 1946 and 1950 (and perhaps extended to 1954) when the country entered the era of multi-party democracy. Then, large amount of votes shifted from the Republican People's Party, the sole party allowed since 1924, to the new Democrat Party. Since this period lies outside the sample period examined in the present study, it is not necessary to discuss it here in detail. 4 A much smaller and shorter-lived realignment has occurred between 1973 and 1975. Before the 1973 election, a political faction split from the Justice Party, the major incumbent party then, and formed the Democratic Party. This new party siphoned off considerable amount of votes from the Justice Party in the 1973 election. However, these votes largely returned back to the party in the following election in 1975 and the Democratic Party virtually disappeared from the political scene after that.
The second major realignment, which manifested itself after 1999, but in hindsight appears to have begun earlier, is of the greatest importance for the current study. After experiencing rampant corruption, poor economic performance, and constant infighting under various coalition governments during the preceding decade, in the November 2002 election, voters ousted all of the parties which had entered the parliament in 1999. Included among these were the Motherland Party (ANAP), which held the premiership during 1983-1991 and 1997-1999 In hindsight, the building of voter frustration was quite evident. In each of the parliamentary elections since 1987, a different party finished first. Since 1991, each election produced a coalition government involving a different combination of parties. After observing no change in party leaderships and policies, despite signal sent through diminishing vote shares, voters finally lost faith in most of the established parties. Major incompetence and rampant corruption exposed by the two major earthquakes in 1999, implicating both the government and the opposition parties may have acted as the straw that broke the camel's back. In 2002 they cast their votes overwhelmingly for three parties: the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Young Party (GP), and the Republican People's Party (CHP). The first two of those were formed shortly before the election, and the last one had been out of the parliament during the previous legislative term, having received less than ten percent of the votes in the 1999 election. Of these the GP turned out to be a flash in the pan. The AKP, which emerged from the ashes of the banned FP, captured the lion's share of the voters who deserted their former parties. The party's disavowal of its Islamist roots, embrace of political and economic reforms necessary for Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU), the non-corrupt and populist image of its mayors at the local level, its message of hope, and the likelihood of it forming a single-party government, all appealed to the electorate which deserted the rightwing ANAP, DYP and MHP. 5 The Felicity Party (SP), the other party rooted in the FP, towed the old party line and received only a couple of percent of the votes, as opposed to the AKP which captured about 34 percent of it. Despite the Islamist background of many of its leaders, the AKP ruled essentially as a moderate, centerright, conservative democrat party would: committed to democracy, free market economy and Turkey's EU membership. This dispelled some of the lingering skepticism concerning the genuineness of the party leaders' transformation, and led more of the liberal minded voters to join its ranks. Interestingly, the party was able to do all that without alienating much of its traditional base. Over the last two decades that base, while holding on to its basic conservative values, got increasingly richer, less isolated, better informed, more entrepreneurial, more modernized, more urbanized, and more integrated with other parts of Turkey and the rest of the world, largely as a result of the introduction of internet, ending of the state monopoly on television and radio, major improvements in the highway and telecommunication systems, and the market-oriented reforms instituted in the eighties by Turgut Özal, the prime-minister then. The leadership which formed the AKP recognized this evolution in the society better than all other parties, and transformed. Consequently they were able to capture the supporters of the parties which failed to adapt despite warnings given by the electorate in the form of dwindling vote shares.
The events that led to the calling of the 22 July 2007 election, four months before the end of the regular legislative term, have exacerbated the realignment process. Series of mass protest rallies were organized against the AKP in the Spring of 2007, to stop it from electing its own candidate as the new president, a thinly veiled threat by the military was posted on their web site on April 27, 2007, called the e-ultimatum by the media, threatening to topple them if they do, and a highly controversial decision was given by the Constitutional Court two days later requiring participation of two-thirds of the deputies in the first round of the presidential balloting in the parliament, practically taking away the ability of the AKP to elect its candidate without the aid of other parties. When the two centerright parties ANAP and DP decided not to participate in the presidential balloting so that the quorum required by the Constitutional Court could not be reached, they disappointed many of their remaining hard core supporters, who finally deserted these parties. In a way what happened can be looked upon as a reverse kind of strategic voting, one where the opposition party supporters came to the aid of the incumbent party, to check the power exercised by the military and the judiciary through undemocratic means. However for ANAP and DP, which come from a tradition of resisting power of the state establishment and opposing interventions by the civilian and military bureaucracy in the rightful domain of elected officials, to side with the military was seen as a fundamental deviation. 6 Thus their loss of support turned out to be permanent and, not transitory as would be the case with strategic voting. The AKP expanded its vote share to 47 percent in the 2007 parliamentary election. It declined to 38 percent in 2009 local administrations election, but as will be shown below, this can be attributed to the poor economic conditions prevailing then, to strategic voting, and to cost of ruling, and not to any new realignment. In short, a mass shift in votes has occurred between 1999 and 2007, which was far more than what could be attributed to usual depreciation in the political capital of the ruling parties or to voter response to the economic conditions.
The last realignment process appears essentially to have come to an end by 2009. Of the four parties which got left out of the parliament in 2002 due to not surpassing the 10 percent threshold, the MHP, DSP, ANAP and DP (then DYP), only the first one was able to engineer a come back. The combined vote share of the rest and the 7 Therefore it appears that the vote shares of these parties have stabilized and are not big enough anymore to make a major difference. The newly formed GP which captured 7 percent of the vote in 2002 turned out to be a flash in the pan. Its share fell to 3 percent in 2007 and to zero in 2009 when it did not even participate in the election. As will be shown in section five, the small number of voters who supported this party in 2007 went to two of the opposition parties in 2009. In short, we can say that the realignment was only a minor factor in the 2009 election and did not affect the incumbent party votes significantly. The analysis in the next section will provide further support in this direction.
2009 election in historical perspective
A vote equation which accounts over time for all of the factors mentioned in the previous two sections is the following:
Where ΔX t = X t--X t-k , and the variables are defined as follows:
V t ,: vote share of the major incumbent party in election held at time t, V t-k : vote share of the major incumbent party in the previous election held k years earlier g t : growth rate of the per capita real GDP during the one-year period preceding the election held at time t (henceforth referred to as the growth rate) p t : inflation rate in GDP implicit price deflator during the one-year period preceding the election held at time t (henceforth referred to as the inflation rate) r t :number of years the major incumbent party was in power since the previous election L t : a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one if the election involved is for local administrations, and zero otherwise B t : a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one if the election involved is a National Assembly by-election only (that is, not held simultaneously with a Senate election), and zero otherwise Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the parameters of equation (1), obtained by fitting it to the nationwide time-series data covering 1951-2007 period, are presented in Table 2 . The table also includes the t-statistics for the parameter estimates, the R-square, the adjusted R-square, and F values, for judging the fit of the equation, and Durbin's (1970) h and White's (1980) chi-square statistics and their probability values to check for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residuals and any misspecification in the equations considered. The equation fits the data exceptionally well. The data used in fitting the equation is given in the appendix with more precise definitions of the variables. Compared to the one used by Akarca and Tansel (2006) , this data set excludes the 1946 election which was considered by many, correctly so, to be unfair. Notes: The dependent variable in the regression is V t , the vote share of the sole incumbent party in case of single-party governments and of the major incumbent party in case of coalitions. For the definitions of variables, see Section 4, and for their measurement, the notes to Table A According to the model estimated, each percentage point increase in the growth rate of per capita real GDP during the one-year period before the election, is expected to raise the share of the major incumbent party in the total vote by 0.77 percentage points. 8 Each percentage point increase in the inflation rate during the same period, on the other hand, lowers this share by 0.12 percentage points or by about one-sixth of that of the growth rate. Thus an incentive exists for Turkish governments to adopt populist policies before elections especially considering the fact that economic conditions prevailing more than a year before the election does not matter. As long as it does not generate an additional inflation exceeding about 6 percentage points, a stimulation of the economy that results in a percentage point increase in the growth rate is advantageous to the main incumbent party. The coefficient of V t-k is close to unity, indicating a strong political inertia. However the parameter is less than unity, consistent with strategic-voting. The model predicts that the major incumbent party is expected to lose 14.6 percent of its vote in the previous election of the same type for simply being the incumbent. 9 This loss is estimated to be 20.6 percent in local and by elections that follow regular parliamentary elections, and 8.6 percent in regular parliamentary elections that follow local or by elections. In addition, the major incumbent party's vote share is anticipated to depreciate at the rate of 5.2 percent per year while in office. Thus in between two parliamentary elections held four or five years apart, the maximum length allowed before 1983 and since 2007, and during 1983-2007, respectively, the primary ruling party is expected to lose 35-41 percent of its vote share. This may explain why the elections in Turkey are held almost always way before their constitutionally mandated time and why the tenures of governments were often short except in few instances when the major incumbent party's vote share was quite high initially. This much loss is hard to compensate with good economic performance and the incumbency advantage estimated to be about 8 percentage points. That is why it is very rare for a party to raise its vote share after ruling a full legislative term. As mentioned above, it occurred only twice since 1946, when the Turkish multi-party democracy begun.
It seems that any advantage a ruling party enjoys in local elections through its ability to channel central government resources to those local administrations under the party's control, is more than cancelled through strategic voting by the electorate. Unless local elections are held very soon after a parliamentary election and thus with less erosion in votes due to cost of ruling, it is highly unlikely for an incumbent party to raise its votes in a local election relative to the previous parliamentary election. Although this finding is contrary to the widely held view by provincial data, show that in 1995 incumbent party votes in Turkey tended to rise in areas where growth rate a year before the election was higher and to fall in those where the growth rate was lower. Growth rate more than a year before the election is found to not matter in its outcome. Akarca and Başlevent (2009) using individual data, show that economic evaluations -especially retrospective ones -had a strong association with the party choice of Turkish voters in 2007. 9 This result is corroborated in micro studies. For example the survey data used by Akarca and Başlevent (2009) the Turkish media and public, even a casual eyeballing of the data presented in the appendix shows that out of the eight local administrations elections, in six, the major incumbent party's vote share has decreased relative to the previous national assembly election. Of the two exceptional local administrations elections, the one in 1977 took place only a few months after the parliamentary election and the one in 2004, coincided with a political realignment taking place, as mentioned before.
The political realignment has cost the DSP, the major incumbent party in 2002, 18.1 percent of the total vote. The AKP on the other hand is estimated to have received about 6.4 percent more of the total vote in 2004 and 2007, due to political realignment. Similarly, it appears that the fragmentation of the major incumbent party in 1973 caused it to lose 7.7 percent of the total vote, which it was able to recoup in 1975.
One way to determine whether the outcome of the 2009 election fits the historical patterns is to predict the outcome based on past patterns and compare that with the actual realization. This is done in Table 3 . The prediction, or in other words, the expected vote share of AKP given the political and economic factors at the time of the election, is right on target. 10 Thus it can be argued that voter behavior in the 2009 election was not different than in previous elections held under similar conditions. Once the historical patterns are taken into account, there is nothing surprising about the outcome of the 29 March 2009 election. Table 3 Table 2 5.
election in geographical perspective
With cross-provincial data, vote equations can be estimated for each individual party, which is not possible with time-series data. 11 When, lagged vote shares of all major parties are included on the right-hand-side of these equations, the vote traffic between any two parties can be measured, controlling for all other interparty vote shifts. In particular, the coefficient of the lagged AKP vote share in the vote equations of the opposition parties will help us determine which of them tended to benefit from votes lost by the incumbent party in 2009.
However, three points have to be taken into account in performing the crossprovincial analysis. First, the effects of strategic-voting, cost of ruling, and national economic conditions can not be measured individually, using cross-section data, as the variables representing them will show no variation across observations. Although the impact of local economic conditions is measurable in principle, as was done in Akarca and Tansel (2007) in regards to the 1995 parliamentary election, due to lack of income data at provincial level since 2001, that is not possible for the 2009 election. Second, factors which can be ignored more easily in the aggregate data, can not be in the analysis of more disaggregated data. Due to differences in their socio-economic, demographic, cultural, and other characteristics, voting patterns are likely to vary across the regions of the country. Thus each region needs to be studied separately. Third, it is not practical to include every party's vote share on the right hand side of vote equations, as that would cause multicollinearity.
Limited number of observations in each region would not permit inclusion of too many independent variables anyway.
There is not much that can be done in regards to the first issue. However, although the effects of strategic-voting, cost of ruling, and national economic conditions can not be measured individually, an estimate of their combined impact can be obtained through the coefficient of the lagged vote share of the AKP in its own equation.
To address the second issue, the provinces are separated into three groups and separate estimates are obtained for each. For this purpose the results of a study by Akarca and Başlevent, (2010) who obtained 3-way and 5-way partitions of the country applying cluster analysis (k-means method) to cross-provincial data is utilized. This study shows that 3-way partition adequately captures the main political cleavages in Turkey but the 5-way partition brings out differences in nuance within each main division. Here the 3-way division is preferred because it sufficiently captures the variation in voter behavior across the country, and the 5-way partition would result in too few observations in some regions to run reliable regressions. Akarca and Başlevent repeat their analysis for each of the five elections between 1999 and 2009. Remarkably, each of the three regions that emerge in each election contains almost the same provinces. By placing the few provinces which change regions between elections, in the cluster in which they appear most, they obtain composite groupings. These should be more reliable than a partition based on one election alone. That is why the composite map, shown in Figure 1 , is used here.
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Figure 1 Regions with different voting patterns in Turkey
Notes: For each of the five elections between 1999 and 2009, the provinces are grouped into three, using cluster analysis (k-means method). Going from west to east, the clusters are numbered 1 through 3 (colored black, dark grey, and light gray, respectively in the map). The provinces which changed clusters between elections are placed in the region in which they appeared most. A tie occurred only in the case of Kars. The province appeared once in 12 It would make little difference if the map obtained for the 2009 election was used instead. The composite map differs from the one for the 2009 election only in the case of four provinces out of eighty-one. Going from west to east, the first cluster which is painted black, follows the Mediterranean, Aegean and Marmara coasts (except Bursa province on the latter) and juts out from eastern Marmara Sea inland all the way to Kırşehir. It also includes provinces which are adjacent to the coastal ones along the Aegean, and a few provinces scattered along the Black Sea. The 29 provinces in this region, where 58.6 percent of the valid votes were cast in 2007, represent the wealthiest, mostmodern, most-educated, most-urbanized and most cosmopolitan part of Turkey. The third cluster, painted light gray, covers a triangular corner of southeastern and middle-eastern Anatolian provinces. It includes 14 provinces where 7.3 percent of the valid votes were cast in 2007. This region is relatively the poorest and least developed part of Turkey, populated heavily by ethnic Kurds. The second region, colored dark gray, is composed of 38 provinces where 34.1 percent of the valid votes were cast in 2007. It lies in between the other two regions not only geographically, but in regards to income and education levels, modernity, and conservatism as well. 13 To address the third issue, only the major flows in vote traffic are taken into account. On the right hand side of each party's equation only the 2007 vote share of that party and those of the parties with vote losses in the region exceeding one percentage point are entered. In each region, vote equations are considered only for those parties which received at least four percent of the regional vote either in 2007 or in 2009. The CHP and DSP, which participated in the 2007 election as partners, are treated as if they are one party. A party's acronym followed by "09" is used to represent its 2009 vote share and its acronym followed by "07" to represent its 2007 vote share. The vote equations for each region are estimated as a Seemingly Unrelated Regression System, using the procedure of Zellner (1962) , to achieve greater statistical efficiency.
The distribution of votes among parties in 2007 and 2009 for the three regions are given in Tables 4 through 6. The tables show that the AKP is the only party with significant presence across the board. However it has lost ground in all three regions with losses rising from west to east, and from the coastal areas to the interior of the country. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 2 , in which provinces where the AKP either gained votes or lost less than the national average are colored black. Most of these are colored black (i.e. are in region 1) in Figure 1 also. Source: Author's computations utilizing data sources given in Table 1 .
The provinces where the party's vote losses were more than twice that of its losses nationally are painted in light gray. The provinces which lie in between the two extremes are colored in dark grey. The pattern observed is consistent with the economic voting literature. This literature implies that, although the incumbency advantage rarely compensates for the strategic-voting and cost of ruling at the national level, it can do so in some localities. In provinces where the party's support was low to start with, because the erosion in its votes due to strategic-voting and cost of ruling will be proportionately lower as well, the incumbency advantage would be able to offset them. Therefore, the vote loss suffered by an incumbent party is likely to be higher in those provinces where its support was highest in the previous election and lower in those where its support was lowest. Indeed, in seven of the ten provinces in which 2007 AKP vote shares were lowest (between 12 and 31 percent), the party's vote share either increased or dropped by less than 3 percentage points. 14 In contrast, in eight of the ten provinces in which the AKP vote shares were highest in 2007 (between 62 to 71 percent), the party's vote losses ranged between 15 and 36 percentage points. 15 It is ironical that, despite the AKP vote losses being lowest in region 1, an impression is ingrained in the minds of the Turkish public that the party's losses were largest there. This was partially due to the maps presented by the news media after the election, similar to the one given in Figure 3 , showing the CHP or the MHP as the number one party in many of the provinces along the Mediterranean, Aegean and western Marmara coastline. The truth is that, although the AKP came second in most of them, in eight of the eleven provinces along this coastline, the party either gained votes or lost less than 3 percentage points between 2007 and 2009, whereas the party's nationwide vote loss was 8.19 percent. 16 Another reason for the misconception was the articles which evaluated the 2009 election results relative to the one in 2004. This can be justified on the grounds that both these elections were for local administrations. However, it ignores the political realignment that has taken place after 2002. As can be observed from Tables 4 through 6 The CHP and the MHP have noticeable presences only in regions 1 and 2. The Democratic Society Party (DTP) clearly is a regional and ethnic-based party, receiving its votes mainly in region 3 where the Kurds are concentrated. The vote share of CHP+DSP increased in regions 1 and 2 but their small share in region 3 remained essentially unchanged. The vote share of the MHP on the other hand, remained about the same in region 1, increased in region 2, and decreased in region 3. DTP raised its votes substantially in region 3 but its small shares in other two regions increased slightly as well. The vote shares of the other parties were substantially smaller in all regions. Nevertheless, among them, the Felicity Party (SP) managed to raise its share in all regions, especially in region 3. The DSP, ANAP, and GP appear to be on the way to extinction. The DP's performance was only a little better than these parties. Although its share in the first two regions continued to decline, it rose slightly in region 3.
To measure the differences in inter-party vote traffic, and in the effects of incumbency, strategic voting and the economy in various parts of the country, the vote equations are estimated for each region separately. To gain in efficiency the equations for each region are estimated as a system, using the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions procedure of Zellner (1962) . The systems estimated include equations for the AKP, CHP+DSP, MHP, DP, and SP in regions 1 and 2, and for AKP, CHP+DSP, DP, SP, and DTP, in region 3. Vote shares of these parties exceeded four percent either in 2007 or 2009 in the respective regions. On the right hand side of each equation, besides the lagged value of the dependent variable, 2007 vote shares of the AKP, DP and GP are included in regions 1 and 2, and of AKP in region 3. The vote losses of the parties mentioned were more than one percent of the total vote in the respective regions. Dummy variables are entered for Eskişehir in the region 1 equations, for Elazığ, Sivas, and Rize, in the region 2 equations, and for Tunceli, in the region 3 equations. The first one of these was added to capture the coattails effect there of the popular mayor of Eskişehir who was able to bring to his party, the DSP, a vote share that is 8.5 times the party's national share and 10.5 times its regional one. In Elazığ, the favorite son candidacy of the former DP leader had brought extra votes to his party in 2007. The coefficients of the dummy for that province will give us hints as to the fate of those votes, after he relinquished his leadership and political involvement in the 2009 election. In Sivas, the Grand Unity Party (BBP) received a lot of sympathy votes, after its leader, a parliament member from that province, died in a helicopter crash a few days before the election, while campaigning. Rize is the home province of the former ANAP leader, where he ran as an independent candidate in 2007 and received substantial amount of votes, when his party did not contest the election. How those votes were distributed among the parties in 2009 can be answered with the help of the coefficient estimates of the dummy variable for that province. Finally, in Tunceli, an independent candidate, not affiliated with any party, had received about a third of the votes in 2007. A comparison of the AKP equations in tables 7 through 9, reveal that the constant terms rise and the slope terms fall as we move from region 1 towards region 3. Thus we can say that the incumbency advantage, and the combined impact of strategic-voting, cost of ruling, and economic conditions, tends to rise, as we go from the west of the country to the east. It appears that incumbency gives a greater advantage in less developed parts of the country where reliance on government is higher and on the market lower. It makes sense also for strategic voting to make a bigger difference in the east. In this region, where small parties receive substantial amount of votes but not enough to surpass the 10 percent threshold applicable in parliamentary elections, it is natural for their supporters to chose other parties in the Grand National Assembly elections but return to fold in local elections. Yet another pattern revealed by the estimated equations is that within each region, the incumbent party's vote losses tend to be higher where the party's support is higher, just as was the case across the three regions. 
Conclusions
Understanding the historical patterns in voting behavior is of great help in explaining and predicting the outcomes of elections. When such patterns are taken into account, in light of the economic voting literature, the vote loss experienced by the AKP in 2009 is not unusual at all, and was predictable beforehand. Much of it can be attributed to the typical response shown to poor economic conditions and the typical strategic-voting observed in local administrations elections. 20 Both of these 20 In that regard, attempts by the prime minister to turn the election climate to that of a general election makes perfect sense from his point of view. On the other hand, his persistent defense of the argument that the global crisis will affect Turkey only tangentially was probably a tactical error on his part. If he blamed the "blond and blue-eyed people" for are temporary set backs. It appears at the time of this writing that the impact of the economy is very likely to be reversed in the 2011 election and that of the strategic voting against the incumbent party will become much milder, with that election being a parliamentary one. Implications of the economic voting literature prove helpful also in understanding the geographical patterns observed in the Turkish voter behavior. In 2009, the AKP came on top in 62 of the 81 provinces but lost votes in every province except six. The party's losses tended to rise with a movement from the west of the country to the east, both in percentage points and in proportion. Interestingly the support for the party shows a similar tendency. It is quite natural for vote losses due to cost of ruling and strategic voting to be larger in the east where the party's support is much higher, and to exceed its incumbency advantage by a larger margin. Although there is a tendency for the incumbency advantage to get larger towards the east, it appears that it is largely offset by the combined impact of strategic-voting, cost of ruling, and the economic conditions, which rises also with a move from the west to the east.
The voters who deserted the AKP appear to have moved to the DP, SP and DTP in the mid-eastern and south-eastern provinces and to the MHP and SP in the rest of the country. Ideologically, the MHP, SP and DP are all right-wing conservative parties like the AKP. The DTP, on the other hand, is a left-wing Kurdish-nationalist party. It appears that some of the conservative Kurds, who supported the AKP in 2004 and 2007, but deserted it in 2009 to protest its handling of the economy and other matters, and to balance its power, voted in 2009 on the basis of their ideology and switched to the SP or the DP. Some of them on the other hand voted on the basis of their ethnic identity and chose the DTP instead. The latter group may have wanted to register their displeasure with the increased crossborder operations in their region by the military after the 2007 election, which the AKP government blocked prior to that election. They may have wanted also to signal to the AKP that they find its initiatives to solve the ethnic issues in the southeast and east not sufficient. 21 With the exception of the MHP, the parties which were at the receiving end of the votes lost by the AKP have not been able to reach the 10 percent nationwide the crisis as the Brazilian president did, perhaps he may have reduced the impact of the economy on his party's vote, somewhat. 21 In that regard, the AKP faces a challenge no other major party in Turkey faces. It is the only party at this point with an appeal across the entire country. It receives votes from both ethnic Kurds and Turks. Thus unless it is careful, the party risks losing at one end while trying to gain at the other. To avoid that, it has to find a delicate balance in its reforms such that they satisfy the Kurds without alienating the Turks. The CHP and MHP on the other hand are almost non-existent in the East and for all practical purposes receive votes only from the Turks. The parties such as the DTP, its predecessors and its successor, Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) have a notable presence only in the East and get support only from the Kurds. So these parties do not face the dilemma the AKP does.
threshold since 1999. They are not likely to do so in the near future either. Consequently, unless they enter the next election in partnership with other parties, as DSP did in 2007, or field independent candidates, as the DTP did in the same election, they are not likely to keep the votes they have gained in the 2009 election. Perhaps it is revelatory to note that in the same regions they increased their votes in the 2009 local elections, the SP and the DP were able to do so in the 2004 local administrations election as well. However they were not able to hold on to those gains in the following parliamentary election (see Tables 4, 5 CHP+DSP received them in the west, and the MHP captured them in the central part of the country. 22 It is interesting that the CHP and DSP shared with the MHP, whatever remained of the GP. This can be taken as a manifestation of these parties appealing to the same base now. The center of gravity for the CHP and the MHP has been moving towards the west over time, and they are both turning into regional parties with negligible presence in the east and south-east where Kurds are concentrated. One reason for this could be that the platforms of CHP and DSP are becoming increasingly similar to that of the MHP and GP. They too exhibit a lack of enthusiasm for the reforms and compromises necessary for the European Union accession, for the settlement of the Cyprus and Kurdish minority issues, and the democratization of the constitution. Furthermore, in comparison with that of the AKP, their positions in regards to economic and social policies are more nationalistic and anti-global.
The vote share of the DP, the last of the former center-right parties, has dwindled but not totally disappeared. It lost some of its supporters to the AKP in the west, to the MHP in the center, while capturing some votes back from the AKP in the mid-east and south-east. This can be interpreted as continuation of the political realignment in 2009. However it involved very few votes now to make any noticeable difference.
The analysis presented in this paper indicates a return to normalcy in Turkish politics with the 2009 election. It suggests that the patterns which prevailed during most of the multi-party democratic era once again can be relied upon to 22 The GP did not have much of a support in the east and south-east to be shared. understand and predict the outcomes of elections. 23 Other lessons that can be drawn from the current study is that unless the entire political record is considered, one can easily reach wrong conclusions, not realizing they are based on outliers, and that one can make better sense of political outcomes, taking advantage of the economic voting literature. In instances when different types of elections are held simultaneously or almost simultaneously, the priority for inclusion in the sample was given first to the National Assembly general elections, next to the Provincial Council elections, then to the Senate elections, and last to the by elections. The Senate and by elections were given lower priorities because, unlike the National Assembly general elections and local elections, they did not cover the whole country. The Senate elections involved only a third of the provinces and only a third of the seats in the Senate that were subject to election. The coverage of by elections were even less, about 15-27 percent of the provinces when they did not coincide with a Senate election. When the Senate and by elections were held simultaneously, their results were aggregated to increase the coverage of the country. In such aggregation, for provinces where the two elections overlapped, only the results of the Senate election is considered. c/ 0.25 times the number of quarters since last election during which the major incumbent party was in power majority of time, either alone or with other parties. d/ 0.25 times the number of quarters since last election during which all incumbent parties were in power simultaneously majority of time, with or without other parties. e/ The growth rate of per capita real GDP during the one-year period preceeding the election, g t , is computed as follows: g t = m G t + (1-m) G t-1 where G t and G t-1 are the growth rates for the year in which the election is held, and the one prior to that. m= 0.00 if the election is held between January 1 1965, 1975 and 1984 , when m is taken as unity because the governments then were either not in power during the year preceding the election or were in power for less than half a quater. For years 1948 and 1968 growth rate of per capita real GNP is substituted for missing growth rate figures for per capita real GDP. f/ The inflation rate in GDP deflator during the one-year period preceding the election, p t , is computed in a similar way as g t as explained above. For the years 1948, and 1968 however, rate of change in GNP deflator is substituted for missing figures for the rate of change in GDP deflator. g/ Republican People's Party (CHP) was treated as the incumbent party. This party was allied with the military regime at the time and supported it or at least perceived by the public as such. m/ A minority government formed by DSP was in power during the four months preceding the election but it was just a caretaker government. For that reason the coalition government in power prior to that for over eighteen months is taken as the incumbent. n/ Vote share of only ANAP and DSP. DTP was formed in 1997 and thus did not enter the 1995 election.
Sources of data:
The dates and the coverage of elections, and the make-up of governments and their time in power, are determined using the information given in Tuncer (2002 Tuncer ( , 2007 Tuncer ( , and 2009 ) and Tuncer and Kasapbaş (2004) .All vote shares are computed by the author, using the data provided by Tuncer (2002 Tuncer ( , 2007 Tuncer ( , and 2009 ) and Tuncer and Kasapbaş (2004) . In aggregating the Grand National Assembly By and Senate elections held in 1975 and 1979, the province level vote data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) of the Republic of Turkey was also utilized. The growth rates are computed by the author, as explained in note (e) above, using the data provided by the TurkStat on per capita real GDP growth rate for all years except 1948 and 1968. For 1948 and 1968, per capita real GNP growth rate is substituted for the missing growth rate in per capita real GDP. In computing the former, the population growth rate, provided by the TurkStat, and the real GNP growth rate, provided by the State Planning Organization (SPO) of the Republic of Turkey are utilized. The GDP series, from which the annual growth rates are obtained, is 1987 based for the years prior to 1998, and 1998 based for years after 1999. The inflation rates are computed by the author, using the rate of change in GDP price deflator for all years except 1948 and 1968, for which the rate of change in GNP price deflator was used instead. The GDP deflator is obtained by dividing nominal GDP by real GDP, both provided by the TurkStat. The rate of change in GNP deflator is provided by the SPO. 
